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While Canada’s experience with the two per cent  • 
inﬂ  ation target has been positive, there may still 
be room for improvement in the Canadian monet-
ary framework. This article reviews our ﬁ  ndings to 
date, places them in the context of the broader lit-
erature, and identiﬁ  es avenues for future research 
leading up to 2011.
The earlier literature and recent studies at the Bank  • 
of Canada suggest that an inﬂ  ation target lower 
than two per cent may be beneﬁ  cial.
With regard to the inﬂ  ation target, future research  • 
should focus on (i) wage-setting behaviour in 
Canada, especially when inﬂ  ation is low; (ii) the role 
that ﬁ  nancial intermediaries play in modulating inﬂ  a-
tion’s macroeconomic effects; and (iii) the transition 
between inﬂ  ation targets.
It is not yet clear whether a price-level target would  • 
be preferable to our current inﬂ  ation target. Further 
research into price-level targeting is thus a priority 
for the Bank’s economists.
With regard to price-level targeting, there are sev- • 
eral topics for future research, including the target’s 
inﬂ  uence on contracting behaviour and inﬂ  ation 
expectations, and how policy-makers can ensure 
credibility in their commitment to price-level target-
ing. Furthermore, some empirical assessment is 
needed concerning the Canadian economy’s vul-
nerability to shocks that the literature identiﬁ  es as 
particularly detrimental to the target’s performance.
The choice of an inﬂ  ation target and/or the imple- • 
mentation of a price-level target could have implica-
tions for the problem of the zero lower bound on 
nominal interest rates.
A
lthough the Canadian experience with inﬂ  ation 
targeting has been very positive, the Bank 
of Canada remains alert to the potential for 
improvement in its approach to monetary policy. In 
2006, when the inﬂ  ation-control target was renewed 
for another ﬁ  ve years, the Bank initiated a research 
program to reassess the current monetary policy 
framework (Bank of Canada 2006).1 This reassess-
ment has focused on two questions: (i) What is the 
optimal rate of inﬂ  ation? (ii) What are the costs and 
beneﬁ  ts of a shift to a price-level target?
The Bank’s research program aims to answer these 
questions in collaboration with partners in academia 
and at other central banks. This article highlights the 
progress to date and places the Bank’s ﬁ  ndings in 
the context of a broader literature. It also identiﬁ  es 
avenues for future research and steps that have been 
taken in these directions. We begin with a discussion 
of optimal inﬂ  ation and then move on to price-level 
targeting (PT). A brief summary of the ﬁ  ndings is pro-
vided in the conclusion.
Optimal Inﬂ  ation
A brief review of the literature
Although inﬂ  ation can inﬂ  uence macroeconomic 
outcomes in many ways, the literature tends to focus 
on two avenues through which inﬂ  ation impacts the 
economy, namely pricing decisions and incentives to 
hold money. We frame a brief review of the literature 
around these two channels.2
1  Under this framework, the Bank’s monetary policy is aimed at keeping total CPI inﬂ  ation 
at two per cent, with a control range of one to three per cent around the target.
2  A third channel, which has been the subject of some Bank of Canada research, is the 
interaction between inﬂ  ation and the tax system (see, for example, O’Reilly and Levac 
2000; Black, Macklem, and Poloz 1994). 
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sion to the case of endogenous growth by Gomme 
(1993), though Gomme ﬁ  nds that the beneﬁ  ts of opti-
mal inﬂ  ation are relatively small and that the optimal 
rate is only modestly negative. Several models com-
bining some role for money with New Keynesian price 
rigidities also ﬁ  nd that deﬂ  ation is optimal, though 
choosing a target in this setting would now involve 
balancing the costs associated with price dispersion 
against those associated with suboptimal money 
holdings. See Khan, King, and Wolman (2003) for an 
example. Levin, López-Salido, and Yun (2007) show 
that strategic complementarities (e.g., quasi-kinked 
demand and ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ  c capital) tend to enhance 
the effects of price dispersion, reducing the extent to 
which money-holding incentives ﬁ  gure in the optimal-
inﬂ  ation decision.
Several related studies aim to estimate the costs of 
suboptimal inﬂ  ation from data on money demand. 
The approach is initially due to Bailey (1956). While 
varying considerably in their estimates, studies gener-
ally ﬁ  nd that these costs are modest. Howitt (1990), 
for example, uses M1 demand estimates produced 
by Boothe and Poloz (1988) to show that a reduc-
tion in Canadian inﬂ  ation from 9 to 0 per cent would 
permanently increase output by 0.1 per cent. A key 
ﬁ  nding in this literature is that results are sensitive 
to the speciﬁ  cation of money demand. For example, 
Lucas (2000) estimates that lowering inﬂ  ation from 
10 to 0 per cent would improve U.S. output by 0.9 per 
cent, while an alternative assumption on the money-
demand function leads Ireland (2007) to place the gain 
around 0.1 per cent.
A growing empirical literature has focused on 
detecting the macroeconomic effects of inﬂ  ation in 
time series and international cross-sections. A key 
theme is that some threshold may exist in the relation-
ship between inﬂ  ation and economic growth. Despite 
the ﬁ  ndings of Kormendi and Meguire (1985) that the 
long-run relationship is signiﬁ  cantly negative across 
47 countries for the years 1950 through 1977, more 
recent studies, beginning with Fischer (1993), have 
found that, below a certain rate of inﬂ  ation, a positive 
or neutral relationship may exist. Current estimates 
on this threshold vary dramatically, ranging from 1 per 
cent for a group of industrial countries in Khan and 
Senhadji (2000) to 10 per cent for a wider sample in 
Judson and Orphanides (1996).  
Recent work at the Bank of Canada
The Bank’s most recent contributions to the optimal-
inﬂ  ation literature can be divided between those 
With regard to pricing decisions, the expectation that 
real prices will erode over time can lead ﬁ  rms operat-
ing in inﬂ  ationary environments to choose prices that 
differ substantially from those set when inﬂ  ation is 
zero. This effect has been studied extensively using 
New Keynesian models, where monopolistically 
competitive ﬁ  rms set nominal prices in a staggered 
fashion using contracts that hold for several periods. 
In this environment, ﬁ  rms facing trend inﬂ  ation antici-
pate that real prices will fall as contracts mature. To 
compensate, they choose to raise prices by a margin 
that grows with the expected rate of inﬂ  ation. This 
behaviour, sometimes dubbed “front-end loading,” 
tends to connect higher inﬂ  ation with greater price 
dispersion and an inefﬁ  cient allocation of demand 
across competitors.3
With regard to money-holding incentives, the expecta-
tion that the currency’s purchasing power will fall over 
time can discourage agents from carrying transaction 
balances, particularly if they could otherwise invest 
in interest-bearing assets. Economists have recently 
studied this effect using so-called “search-theoretic” 
models. In these models, following seminal work by 
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), agents choose to hold 
money because their preferences are unlikely to 
coincide with those of trading partners. Inﬂ  ation then 
inﬂ  uences the amount of money that agents choose 
to carry, with direct implications for the extent and 
pattern of trade. An alternative method for modelling 
the relationship between inﬂ  ation and money holding 
is highlighted in Cooley and Hansen (1989), which 
incorporates money into a real business cycle model 
via a cash-in-advance constraint.
Estimates on the optimal rate of inﬂ  ation are quite 
sensitive to assumptions about which of these 
channels is stronger. For example, when inﬂ  ation’s 
macroeconomic effects accrue only via its impact on 
pricing decisions, the main goal for policy-makers is 
normally to minimize price dispersion, and the optimal 
rate is near zero. On the other hand, if inﬂ  ation acts 
only via money-holding incentives, a negative rate can 
be optimal: As per the famous “Friedman rule” (1969), 
deﬂ  ating at a rate that drives the nominal interest 
rate to zero resolves the money-holding problem by 
making agents indifferent between transaction bal-
ances and interest-bearing investments.
Prescriptions for deﬂ  ation can hold in search-theoretic 
settings (see, for example, Lagos and Wright 2005 
and Rocheteau and Wright 2005). They also hold in 
3   See Ambler (2007–2008) for a more comprehensive review of inﬂ  ation’s effects in New 
Keynesian environments. See also Woodford (2002). 
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the fact that inﬂ  ation is more persistent at higher rates 
of trend inﬂ  ation. Increases in the volatility and persis-
tence of several macroeconomic variables also follow 
directly from this relationship, which is invariant to the 
exact form of nominal rigidity in effect. The authors 
conclude that estimates based on steady-state cal-
culations are likely to understate the welfare effects of 
trend inﬂ  ation. Because the connection between trend 
inﬂ  ation and price dispersion is key to their results, 
they ﬁ  nd that inﬂ  ation near zero is optimal. 
The search-theoretic approach
Compared with the New Keynesian approach, which 
either focuses on cashless economies or introduces 
money via ad hoc assumptions, monetary search 
theory explicitly models the frictions that give rise 
to the need for money. In a key study by Lagos and 
Wright (2005), for example, agents choose to hold 
money because, as explained earlier, their prefer-
ences are unlikely to coincide when meeting potential 
trading partners.6
At the Bank, Chiu and Molico (2007, 2008) extend 
the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework to study 
inﬂ  ation’s effects when money holdings vary across 
households. Their model is constructed to be con-
sistent with data on aggregate money demand, as 
well as the distribution of money holdings across 
households. In this model, inﬂ  ation can have signiﬁ  -
cant redistributive effects that transfer real balances 
from cash-rich households to cash-poor households. 
These redistributive effects partially offset inﬂ  ation’s 
negative impact as a tax on money holding. As a 
result, some positive deviation from the Friedman rule 
can be welfare improving. Furthermore, the costs of 
suboptimal inﬂ  ation are found to be smaller than in 
previous estimates and exhibit non-linearities that 
invalidate the methodologies applied in Lucas (2000) 
and Ireland (2007), where costs are calculated from 
the area under the money demand curve. In contrast 
to Lucas’s estimate of 0.9 per cent, Chiu and Molico 
(2008) ﬁ  nd that reducing inﬂ  ation from 10 to 0 per cent 
improves welfare by only 0.59 per cent.
Challenges for the future
The range of estimates on the optimal rate of inﬂ  ation 
suggests that ﬁ  ndings in the literature are sensitive 
to assumptions about the economy and the avenues 
by which inﬂ  ation can affect real outcomes. Future 
6  Although agents could conceivably use credit arrangements as an alternative to money 
holding, an assumption that agents transact anonymously implies that credit contracts 
cannot be enforced.
focusing on the New Keynesian environment and 
those focusing on the search-theoretic perspective. 
The New Keynesian approach
Amano et al. (2007) consider an extension of the New 
Keynesian framework that incorporates exogenous 
productivity growth and staggered wage and price 
setting. In addition to the standard “front-end loading” 
effect, the authors also document an effect that stems 
from the interaction of inﬂ  ation, productivity growth, 
and nominal wage rigidity: Deﬂ  ation partially compen-
sates for nominal wage rigidity by allowing the real 
wage to rise as labour productivity improves. Realistic 
parameterizations imply that the wage effect has 
stronger welfare implications than price dispersion, 
leading the authors to conclude that deﬂ  ation near the 
rate of productivity growth is optimal. This is consist-
ent with some insights from an earlier literature on 
the potential beneﬁ  ts of negative trend inﬂ  ation when 
productivity improves over time (Selgin 1995).
As explained above, the case for deﬂ  ation normally 
depends on some assumption that agents face 
incentives to hold transaction balances. No such 
incentives exist in Amano et al. (2007), which features 
neither a cash-in-advance constraint nor a preference 
for money holdings and yet ﬁ  nds that deﬂ  ation is 
optimal.4 Amano et al. (2007) also ﬁ  nd that deviations 
from the optimal rate can be quite costly, mainly 
because of nominal wage rigidities. A shift from 
two per cent inﬂ  ation to the optimum improves welfare 
by 0.8 per cent. This estimate is high relative to those 
found in previous literature, even in studies featuring 
staggered price setting.
While Amano et al. (2007) focus on inﬂ  ation’s steady-
state effects, Amano, Ambler, and Rebei (2007) 
consider a more dynamic setting. They relax one of 
the literature’s most common assumptions—that ﬁ  rms 
failing to reset their prices nonetheless index them to 
trend inﬂ  ation—and then estimate the effects of trend 
inﬂ  ation in a stochastic environment where ﬁ  rms face 
various nominal price rigidities.5 The study extends 
related work by Bakhshi et al. (2003) and Ascari 
(2004).
An important ﬁ  nding in Amano, Ambler, and Rebei 
(2007) is that trend inﬂ  ation tends to impact the sto-
chastic means of output, consumption, price disper-
sion, and other key variables more dramatically than 
4  Wolman (2009) makes a similar case for deﬂ  ation in a two-sector economy where the 
relative price of output produced by the sector with greater nominal rigidities is increasing 
over time. 
5  The assumptions that ﬁ  rms index to target inﬂ  ation or to some weighted average of past 
inﬂ  ation are also common and were relaxed in Amano, Ambler, and Rebei (2007).
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accurate estimates of the welfare effects of a change 
in the inﬂ  ation target need to take into account 
potential shifts in the extent and pattern of liquidity 
provision by intermediaries. Further inquiry into the 
role of intermediaries in modulating inﬂ  ation’s welfare 
effects, particularly during periods of ﬁ  nancial instabil-
ity, would be worthwhile. 
Transition between targets
In estimating the welfare effects associated with a 
shift towards the optimal rate of trend inﬂ  ation, several 
of the Bank’s recent projects, including Amano et al. 
(2007) and Chiu and Molico (2007, 2008), compare 
the long-run implications of trend inﬂ  ation, ignoring 
the economy’s short-run behaviour during the transi-
tion. However, this behaviour may be important: If the 
differences that emerge in the long-run analysis are 
modest, then after discounting, they could be offset 
by losses during transition. Some attention to short-
run dynamics is therefore warranted.
The credibility of central bankers can be 
an important contributor to successful 
transitions between targets.
Inﬂ  ation expectations and how agents update them 
ﬁ  gure prominently in the modern literature on inﬂ  ation 
targets. Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), Erceg and 
Levin (2003), and Moran (2005) all model transitions 
where agents gradually learn about changes in the 
central bank’s inﬂ  ation target, rather than assimilating 
these changes immediately. Moran (2005) demon-
strates that the welfare costs during transition vary 
dramatically with the speed of the learning process, 
suggesting that the credibility of central bankers can 
be an important contributor to successful transitions. 
New emphasis on labour markets
The ﬁ  nding in Amano et al. (2007) that nominal wage 
rigidities account for most of inﬂ  ation’s welfare costs 
suggests that labour markets can play an import-
ant role in determining the optimal rate of inﬂ  ation. 
Further study into this role should prove worthwhile. 
In ongoing work, Amano, Murchison, and Shukayev 
7  However, as mentioned earlier, this model considers only the brokering, or “liquidity-pro-
vision” function of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. A full assessment of intermediation’s welfare 
effects should also consider credit monitoring and other functions.
research must therefore test how robustly these ﬁ  nd-
ings hold as assumptions are relaxed and replaced. 
Below, we consider four interesting extensions.
Estimates on the optimal rate of inﬂ  ation 
are sensitive to assumptions about the 
economy and the avenues by which inﬂ  a-
tion can affect real outcomes.
The implications of ﬁ  nancial 
intermediation
A key ﬁ  nding in Chiu and Molico (2007) is that inﬂ  ation 
can have non-linear welfare effects, depending on 
how inﬂ  ation affects agents’ decisions to adjust their 
money holdings. The ease with which these adjust-
ments can be made likely varies with the structure 
and sophistication of the banking sector. In this sense, 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries can play a role in the optimal-
inﬂ  ation narrative. 
Another avenue through which intermediaries might 
modulate the effects of inﬂ  ation is explored by Chiu 
and Meh (2008), who recently extended earlier work 
by Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2007). Chiu 
and Meh suppose that entrepreneurs are randomly 
apprised of investment opportunities and have access 
to ﬁ  nancial intermediation. If a project’s costs exceed 
or fall short of an entrepreneur’s money holdings, 
the entrepreneur can borrow or lend the difference, 
respectively, although potentially at some ﬁ  xed cost. 
In this way, Chiu and Meh capture the role that inter-
mediaries play as providers of liquidity, although they 
abstract from other roles, such as credit monitoring.
In this environment, interesting non-linearities emerge 
in the relationships among welfare, intermediation, 
and inﬂ  ation. At high levels of inﬂ  ation, banks are able 
to improve welfare by offering entrepreneurs a return 
on their money holdings, motivating them to hold 
more transactions balances and, thus, to invest in 
marginal projects. At the Friedman rule, ﬁ  rms cannot 
justify the ﬁ  xed cost of intermediation, and liquidity 
provision by intermediaries cannot improve welfare. At 
intermediate rates of inﬂ  ation, it is possible for liquid-
ity provision to have negative welfare effects, since 
agents fail to take into account a potential externality 
when borrowing, namely, that an agent’s option to 
borrow reduces his/her demand for money, which 
can cause the liquidity constraints of other agents 
8  
NEXT STEPS FOR CANADIAN MONETARY POLICY
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW   SPRING  2009rule, which explicitly advocates an inﬂ  ation target 
that forces nominal interest rates to zero. It would be 
optimal for policy-makers instead to target a more 
positive rate and thus reduce the likelihood of strik-
ing the bound. At the Bank, Lavoie and Pioro (2007) 
show that this likelihood falls as the target rises, so 
that a two per cent target provides a buffer over the 
zero bound. In more recent work, Nishiyama (2009) 
shows that a positive target’s usefulness as a buffer 
grows with the lags attending monetary transmission. 
Outside the Bank, using a stochastic model where 
central bankers explicitly trade off the costs of inﬂ  a-
tion and the likelihood of reaching the bound, Billi 
(2007) places the optimal inﬂ  ation rate around 0.7 per 
cent, which rises to 1.4 per cent when a speciﬁ  c type 
of model uncertainty is taken into account.
The signiﬁ  cance of the zero lower bound 
has increased in the aftermath of the 
2007 subprime-mortgage meltdown.
The signiﬁ  cance of the zero lower bound has 
increased in the aftermath of the 2007 subprime-
mortgage meltdown, which prompted dramatic reduc-
tions in the policy rates of central banks throughout 
the developed world. At the Bank of Canada, for 
example, these developments have motivated recent 
efforts to better incorporate the zero bound into our 
projection framework. Further research focusing 
speciﬁ  cally on the connections between the inﬂ  ation 
target and the zero lower bound, as in Lavoie and 
Pioro (2007) and Nishiyama (2009), should be a prior-
ity in the future. 
Price-Level Targeting
A brief review of the literature
Despite its recent successes in terms of macro-
stabilization, several authors have highlighted some 
shortcomings in the inﬂ  ation-targeting (IT) framework. 
Most notably, uncertainty on the price level grows 
with the planning horizon, since central banks with 
inﬂ  ation targets accommodate shocks to the price 
level, taking the post-shock level as given and aiming 
to stabilize inﬂ  ation from this level. In fact, the price 
level is unbounded at very distant horizons. Price-level 
targeting (PT) mitigates this uncertainty by commit-
ting central banks to restore the price level to a pre-
announced target following shocks. PT is frequently 
(2009) relax the allocative wage assumption implicit in 
Amano et al. (2007): Rather than assuming that work-
ers commit to service whatever demand their nominal 
wage elicits, as is common in the New Keynesian 
literature, the authors suppose that workers simultan-
eously contract on nominal wages and hours worked. 
The impact of inﬂ  ation on the labour market is thus 
substantially weakened. Hours worked remain ﬁ  xed 
for most contracts despite inﬂ  ation-induced shifts in 
the real wage, and any contracts being renegotiated 
take these shifts fully into account when setting both 
hours and the nominal wage. As a result, it is prefer-
able for the central bank to set policy to minimize 
distortions elsewhere in the economy. With nominal 
rigidity in product markets, for example, the optimal 
rate of inﬂ  ation is close to zero, rather than being 
negative, as suggested in Amano et al. (2007). As well, 
deviations from the optimum prove much less costly 
than in Amano et al. (2007). 
One avenue for future research relevant to the role 
of labour markets in determining optimal inﬂ  ation 
focuses on downward rigidity in nominal wages. 
Several authors have argued that ﬁ  rms ﬁ  nd it dif-
ﬁ  cult to reduce nominal wages and thus have greater 
freedom to lower real wages when inﬂ  ation is positive 
(see, for example, Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry 2000). 
Statistical evidence of some downward rigidity in 
Canadian wages is documented in Crawford and 
Harrison (1998), although Farès and Hogan (2000) 
fail to ﬁ  nd signs that low inﬂ  ation has hindered the 
operation of Canadian labour markets. Kim and Ruge-
Murcia (2007) recently embedded downward rigidity 
into a dynamic stochastic environment and placed 
optimal inﬂ  ation around 1.2 per cent in the United 
States.
The zero lower bound on 
nominal interest rates
As explained in Summers (1991), it may be difﬁ  cult 
to implement expansionary monetary policy when 
rates are at or near zero, since nominal interest rates 
cannot be negative. Various authors have since noted 
the example of recent economic weakness in Japan 
during the years 1995–2005, when short-term rates 
largely held in this range.
The relevance of the zero lower bound in choosing an 
inﬂ  ation target is open to debate. Schmitt-Grohé and 
Uribe (2007), in their extension of the framework of 
Altig et al. (2005), show that the bound has no signiﬁ  -
cant implications for their ﬁ  nding that mild deﬂ  ation is 
optimal. If the lower bound argument holds, however, 
it offers an obvious counterbalance to the Friedman 
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In recent years, PT has attracted greater attention 
among the Bank’s researchers than has optimal inﬂ  a-
tion. This work can be divided into four areas: (i) PT’s 
general merits from a macrostabilization perspective; 
(ii) central bank credibility and its implications for PT; 
(iii) the challenges for PT in a small, open economy; 
and (iv) avenues through which PT can affect an 
agent’s decision to enter into long-term contracts. We 
consider each area in turn.
Price-level targeting as a stabilizing tool
As noted in the literature review, the role of expecta-
tions as automatic stabilizers opens up the possibility 
that PT may dominate IT in certain environments. This 
possibility prompts Cateau (2008) to test PT’s per-
formance in Canada using our main projection model, 
ToTEM.8 His key ﬁ  nding is that PT indeed outperforms 
IT. He also ﬁ  nds that, relative to IT, PT proves more 
robust to model uncertainty in the sense of Hansen 
and Sargent (2008); that is, if ToTEM is assumed to 
represent an inaccurate version of the Canadian econ-
omy, then PT’s performance suffers less dramatically 
as the model’s inaccuracy increases.
Further evidence that PT outperforms IT is offered 
in Coletti, Lalonde, and Muir (2008), based on work 
with a Canada–U.S. version of GEM, the IMF’s Global 
Economy Model, calibrated to ﬁ  t U.S. and Canadian 
data. The ﬁ  nding that PT performs better than IT is 
robust to several assumptions, including the speci-
ﬁ  cation of U.S. monetary policy. Gains, however, are 
modest relative to IT. PT tends to trade less-volatile 
inﬂ  ation for more-volatile output, rather than reducing 
volatility in both variables.
Coletti, Lalonde, and Muir (2008) ﬁ  nd that PT outper-
forms IT speciﬁ  cally following shocks that generate 
positive correlation between inﬂ  ation and the output 
gap (such as demand shocks), whereas IT performs 
better following shocks that induce negative correla-
tion between these variables (such as markup and 
labour supply shocks). The case for PT thus proves 
sensitive to the structure and distribution of shocks. In 
Coletti, Lalonde, and Muir (2008), the ﬁ  nding that PT 
generally performs better than IT follows from the fact 
that shocks generating positive correlation between 
inﬂ  ation and the output gap account for a greater 
share of volatility in these variables when the model is 
taken to Canadian and U.S. data.
8  See Murchison and Rennison (2006) for an overview of ToTEM.
described as a departure from IT’s prescription for 
letting “bygones be bygones.”
A common argument in favour of price-
level targeting highlights its effects on 
inﬂ  ation expectations.
A common argument in favour of PT highlights its 
effects on inﬂ  ation expectations, which may motiv-
ate stabilizing behaviour among agents. Thus, under 
PT, the expectation that policy-makers will target 
below-average inﬂ  ation, following positive shocks to 
the price level, discourages ﬁ  rms from raising prices 
as dramatically as they would under a regime that 
accommodated shocks (Svensson 1999). Thus, acting 
via this expectations channel, PT could theoretically 
deliver lower volatility in both output and inﬂ  ation. 
This ﬁ  nding represents a dramatic departure from 
the earlier view that PT necessarily involved greater 
volatility in inﬂ  ation, since periods of below-average 
inﬂ  ation would follow periods of above-average inﬂ  a-
tion (and vice versa). 
While Svensson’s analysis focuses on the New 
Classical Phillips curve, Dittmar and Gavin (2000) 
and Vestin (2006) show that his ﬁ  ndings also hold in 
a New Keynesian setting. Steinsson (2003) identiﬁ  es 
an important exception to the dominance of PT over 
IT, namely, when a large number of so-called “rule-
of-thumb” ﬁ  rms set their prices according to a back-
ward-looking rule. In fact, failure can occur owing to 
any factor that induces sufﬁ  ciently backward-looking 
inﬂ  ation expectations.
Another argument in favour of PT emphasizes the 
costs imposed on risk-averse agents facing price-
level uncertainty whenever they enter into contracts 
whose terms are imperfectly indexed to inﬂ  ation, 
such as mortgages. To the extent that PT reduces 
these costs, it may create an incentive for long-term 
ﬁ  nancial contracting, with potential beneﬁ  ts for output 
and welfare. Views as to whether signiﬁ  cant beneﬁ  ts 
should be expected vary considerably, as shown 
recently in Ambler (2007–2008) and Côté (2007). 
Howitt (2001) describes “long-term price-level uncer-
tainty [as] one of the most serious consequences of 
inﬂ  ation, because of its ruinous effects on long-term 
contracting,” while Fischer (1994) argues that agents 
already have sufﬁ  cient access to insurance against 
this uncertainty, mainly through indexed bonds.
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ﬁ  nd that costs arising from imperfect credibility more 
than offset the beneﬁ  ts accruing from PT’s superior 
performance once credibility has been established. 
See Cateau et al. (2009) for an extension that uses 
ToTEM to study PT’s performance when agents are 
initially unconvinced of the central bank’s credibility. 
As in Kryvtsov, Shukayev, and Ueberfeldt (2008), the 
authors ﬁ  nd that imperfect credibility reduces the 
beneﬁ  ts associated with the shift from IT to PT. 
PT’s performance suffers when uncer-
tainty about a central bank’s commit-
ment to PT is persistent.
In contrast to these two studies, Masson and 
Shukayev (2008) consider a chronic challenge 
attending credible commitment to PT. Even after the 
central bank has shifted from IT to PT, the authors 
expect that agents may question the bank’s willing-
ness to adhere to PT in the face of large shocks that 
can be reversed only at substantial cost to output. 
Thus, agents attach some probability to policy-
makers’ opting to reset the price path.
Masson and Shukayev argue that a precedent for 
such behaviour can be found in the history of the gold 
standard in the early 20th century, when the standard 
was suspended and resumed at new parities. This 
precedent suggests that PT would likely be imple-
mented with an “escape clause,” explicit or otherwise. 
Masson and Shukayev (2008) develop a model for the 
escape clause by supposing that a drop in the output 
gap below some threshold triggers a reset in the price 
target. In this case, much like Kryvtsov, Shukayev, 
and Ueberfeldt (2008), agents’ assignment of some 
probability to a reset when forming inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions means that these expectations fail to serve 
as strong stabilizers. This failure necessitates more 
aggressive policy, which in turn leads to higher output 
volatility. This last effect is quite pronounced. For 
example, when the threshold is set at a level implying 
that resets will occur with unconditional probability of 
0.4 per cent, the output gap is about 30 per cent more 
volatile than in an economy without an escape clause. 
Because the conditional probability of reset evolves 
endogenously, higher volatility in turn increases the 
likelihood that the threshold will be breached, pot-
entially giving rise to self-fulﬁ  lling crises and multiple 
equilibria. The authors identify a range of thresholds, 
Another key ﬁ  nding in Coletti, Lalonde, and Muir 
(2008) is that the beneﬁ  ts associated with the shift to 
PT rise with the weight assigned to forward-looking 
expectations in the Phillips curve. This point is con-
sistent with the notion that PT operates better when 
expectations are strongly forward-looking. 
While Cateau (2008) and Coletti, Lalonde, and Muir 
(2008) consider PT in the context of large-scale 
models, Covas and Zhang (2008) use a more stylized 
framework based on Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 
(1999) to test how robustly the case for PT holds in 
the presence of ﬁ  nancial frictions. More speciﬁ  cally, 
they consider a sticky-price environment in which 
entrepreneurs have access only to nominal debt con-
tracts, while capital producers face counter-cyclical, 
quadratic costs when issuing equity. In this environ-
ment, PT continues to dominate IT, although the 
gain is smaller when ﬁ  nancial frictions are taken into 
account. As in Coletti, Lalonde, and Muir (2008), the 
results depend on the kind of shocks being modelled. 
PT’s weaker performance in the presence of ﬁ  nancial 
frictions stems directly from a shock to the capital-
producing technology; when frictions exist, this shock 
tends to generate a negative correlation between 
inﬂ  ation and the output gap, forcing an undesirable 
trade-off onto PT.
Credible commitment to 
price-level targeting
The potential for expectations to serve as automatic 
stabilizers under PT suggests that performance 
will depend on the extent to which policy-makers 
can inﬂ  uence inﬂ  ation expectations. As a result, the 
credibility with which policy-makers implement PT 
likely inﬂ  uences the target’s performance, a possibil-
ity explored in Kryvtsov, Shukayev, and Ueberfeldt 
(2008), Cateau et al. (2009), and Masson and 
Shukayev (2008).
Kryvtsov, Shukayev, and Ueberfeldt (2008) consider 
the costs of imperfect credibility during the transition 
from IT to PT. Speciﬁ  cally, they suppose that agents 
are initially uncertain that the central bank will follow 
through on its commitment to PT and believe that 
policy-makers may revert to IT. A key ﬁ  nding is that 
PT’s performance suffers when uncertainty is persis-
tent. Expectations fail to serve as strong stabilizers 
to the extent that agents forming these expecta-
tions assign a positive weight to the shift back to IT. 
In this case, greater output losses are required to 
achieve a given price path, relative to the case where 
policy-makers are perfectly credible. In fact, when 
persistence exceeds a threshold—speciﬁ  cally, when 
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in response to unexpected shifts in the price level. 
They then use a heterogeneous-agent framework to 
understand how redistribution might impact savings 
and labour decisions for household groups varying in 
terms of age and socio-economic status. 
Long-term instruments are less likely to 
occasion redistribution under PT.
Since redistribution occurs only if the price level dif-
fers at payout from the investor’s initial expectation, 
long-term instruments are less likely to occasion 
redistribution under PT, which commits the central 
bank to restore the price path within a certain horizon. 
Since Meh, Ríos-Rull, and Terajima (2008) ﬁ  nd that 
the average Canadian household holds about 70 per 
cent of its unindexed assets and liabilities in the form 
of long-term instruments, PT is able to mitigate the 
potential for redistribution considerably. Indeed, for a 
given price shock, the authors report that the extent of 
redistribution is smaller under PT, relative to IT; effects 
on labour, savings, and other key macroeconomic 
variables also tend to be smaller under PT. Since the 
danger that price shocks will trigger some real redis-
tribution of wealth between borrowers and lenders 
is a disincentive to long-term nominal contracts, the 
results suggest that these contracts might be more 
popular under PT. 
The notion that PT is better able to stabilize the 
real distribution of wealth is also highlighted in Dib, 
Mendicino, and Zhang (2008), which models busi-
ness cycles in a multi-sector open economy featuring 
nominal price rigidities and nominal debt contracts. 
PT’s dominance in this environment stems from the 
fact that policy-makers are able to rely on automatic 
stabilizers in achieving their goals, reducing the extent 
to which they must vary the real interest rate. As a 
result, there is less potential for redistribution between 
borrowers and lenders in the market for nominal 
debt. On the other hand, the real interest rate varies 
more dramatically under IT. IT is thus forced to trade 
volatility in the rate of inﬂ  ation for volatility in the real 
interest rate, leaving policy-makers ill-equipped to 
manage both price dispersion in the goods market 
and distortion in the nominal debt market. The result 
proves robust to parameter uncertainty, although the 
beneﬁ  ts associated with a shift to PT are diminished 
if IT is implemented with some weight on interest-rate 
smoothing.
for example, for which their model can support both 
good and bad equilibria, where bad outcomes are 
associated with greater volatility and higher probabil-
ity of reset. These ﬁ  ndings suggest that PT’s perform-
ance hinges critically on the credibility of monetary 
policy.
Price-level targeting in an open economy
Large, persistent shocks to the terms of trade 
have been identiﬁ  ed as a potential threat to PT in 
small open economies. The concern here is that cen-
tral bankers could induce large output ﬂ  uctuations if 
they are to unwind all pass-through to the price level. 
In their work with a Canada–U.S. version of GEM, 
Coletti, Lalonde, and Muir (2008) ﬁ  nd that PT con-
tinues to dominate IT even in the face of shocks 
accounting for most of the variation in Canada’s 
terms of trade. However, in ongoing work at the 
Bank, De Resende, Dib, and Kichian (2008) and 
Amano, Kryvtsov, and Murray (2009) develop open-
economy models in which PT’s performance can be 
compromised. 
While Coletti, Lalonde, and Muir (2008) abstract from 
commodity markets and their potential implications 
for PT’s performance in small, open economies, 
ongoing work by Coletti et al. (2009) considers the 
transmission of global commodity market shocks 
using a Canada–U.S. version of GEM that explicitly 
includes oil and commodity sectors.9 The authors ﬁ  nd 
that permanent oil supply shocks generate greater 
macroeconomic volatility under PT, relative to IT. PT’s 
poor performance following these shocks is due to the 
fact that oil suppliers and demanders face substantial 
real adjustment costs; as a result, shocks induce 
highly persistent cost-push pressures, leading to a 
signiﬁ  cant deterioration in the inﬂ  ation-output trade-
off available to central banks, particularly price-level 
targeters.
Price-level targeting and 
long-term contracting
The notion that PT may inﬂ  uence long-term ﬁ  nancial 
contracting through a reduction in price-level uncer-
tainty is central to recent work by Meh, Ríos-Rull, and 
Terajima (2008). The authors develop a framework for 
estimating the effects of price-level uncertainty on 
the value of imperfectly indexed assets and liabilities. 
Using a data-intensive procedure from Doepke and 
Schneider (2006), they estimate the changes in the 
9  See Lalonde and Muir (2007) for a full description of this model.
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vary across IT and PT regimes, particularly if PT 
encourages a shift into long-term nominal contracts, 
as suggested earlier, since PT might then lead ﬁ  rms 
to adjust prices less frequently. This is an example of 
the famous “Lucas critique” (1976), which notes that 
models for policy can be misleading if they fail to take 
into account all avenues via which policy can affect 
economic behaviour.
If the Lucas critique is applicable, then future research 
will require frameworks in which nominal rigidities 
are at least partially endogenous to monetary policy. 
Amano, Ambler, and Ireland (2007) have developed 
a framework that allows households to choose the 
extent to which their wage contracts are indexed to 
deviations from trend inﬂ  ation, conditional on the 
monetary policy that is in effect. The authors ﬁ  nd that 
households prefer less indexation under PT, mainly 
because they expect that positive deviations will be 
unwound as policy-makers aim to restore the target 
path for the price level. 
These points can also apply to ﬁ  nancial contracts. In 
this regard, it is important to note that Meh, Ríos-Rull, 
and Terajima (2008) take as given the portfolios of 
households, businesses, government, and foreigners 
when estimating the redistributive effects of inﬂ  ation 
under IT and PT. In fact, under a PT regime, agents 
might opt to hold portfolios with different maturities 
and/or indexation status. This suggests the need 
for frameworks that endogenize portfolio choice 
with respect to monetary policy. Meh, Quadrini, and 
Terajima (2009) have recently developed a micro-
founded model for contracting on indexation status. In 
ongoing work highlighted in this issue, they have also 
sought to endogenize choice across maturities.
Endogenous credibility
Aforementioned work by Kryvtsov, Shukayev, and 
Ueberfeldt (2008), Cateau et al. (2009), and Masson 
and Shukayev (2008) suggests that imperfect cred-
ibility among central bankers can undermine PT’s 
performance. It is natural then to ask what steps 
policy-makers can take to better ensure their credibil-
ity. Research on this front, with special attention to the 
Bank’s communication strategy, would be interesting 
and rewarding.
10  Covas and Zhang (2008) consider staggered price setting in the sense of Calvo (1983). If 
we instead considered staggered price setting in the sense of Taylor (1980), as in Amano 
et al. (2007), the relevant assumption would have to do with the number of periods over 
which nominal price contracts remain in effect. 
Challenges for the future 
From the foregoing discussion, we can identify several 
topics for future research. Furthermore, ﬁ  nancial inter-
mediaries and labour markets, aside from their impli-
cations for optimal inﬂ  ation, are likely also relevant in 
the IT-PT debate. In what follows, we focus on four 
avenues for future research. 
Empirical assessment
Although many of our ﬁ  ndings to date tend to favour 
PT over IT, we have shown that PT’s performance is 
sensitive to several factors, including the structure 
and distribution of shocks and the process underlying 
the formation of inﬂ  ation expectations. In particular, 
PT tends to perform poorly when inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions are highly backward-looking and/or when the 
economy is vulnerable to large markup shocks, labour 
supply shocks, and other shocks generating negative 
correlation between output and inﬂ  ation. Shocks to 
the terms of trade and certain commodity shocks may 
also present challenges. Some empirical assessment 
is needed to determine whether these problems are 
quantitatively relevant in the Canadian case. 
PT’s performance is sensitive to the 
structure and distribution of shocks and 
the process underlying the formation of 
inﬂ  ation expectations.
With regard to inﬂ  ation expectations, an accur-
ate assessment could be quite challenging, since 
the literature is currently divided on the extent to 
which backward-looking behaviour inﬂ  uences these 
expectations. Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2005), 
for example, ﬁ  nd that the inﬂ  uence is minimal, while 
Rudd and Whelan (2005) argue that the inﬂ  uence is 
important, a point with which Dorich (2009) concurs 
in ongoing work at the Bank. See Dorich (2009) for a 
thorough review of the literature and a novel approach 
to the problem. 
Endogenous contracting
In studies that apply sticky-price models to the IT-PT 
debate (e.g., Covas and Zhang 2008), the results 
can be sensitive to assumptions regarding nominal 
rigidities. In Covas and Zhang (2008), for example, 
some assumption must be made about the likeli-
hood that a ﬁ  rm will adjust its nominal price in the 
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The zero lower bound on 
nominal interest rates (II)
Several authors have recently argued that PT offers 
a (partial) solution to the problem of the zero lower 
bound. Svensson (2003) argues that commitment to 
an upward-sloping price path can help policy-makers 
to escape a situation where the constraint binds, while 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Wolman (2005) 
suggest that nominal interest rates are less likely to 
reach their lower bound under PT. 
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interested in the zero lower bound, including its impli-
cations for PT’s performance. Lavoie and Pioro (2007), 
for example, have used ToTEM to study some of these 
implications in a Canadian context. In the future, this 
aspect of the argument in favour of PT will continue to 
receive attention at the Bank.
Conclusions
The key ﬁ  ndings of this review can be summarized 
brieﬂ  y. An inﬂ ation target below two per cent is likely 
preferable to the status quo. At this stage, however, 
it is unclear how much Canadians would beneﬁ  t from 
some shift to a lower target. It is also unclear how 
much lower policy-makers should aim. With regard 
to a lower inﬂ  ation target, future research topics 
include the inﬂ  uence of labour markets and ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries and the economy’s behaviour during 
transition between targets.
It is also unclear whether a price-level target could 
improve upon our current inﬂ  ation target. In particular, 
the performance of a price-level target may suffer if 
inﬂ  ation expectations are highly backward-looking 
and/or if the economy is vulnerable to shocks gener-
ating negative correlation between output and inﬂ  a-
tion, such as markup shocks, labour supply shocks, 
and certain commodity shocks. Future research 
should assess whether these factors are quantitatively 
relevant for Canadian monetary policy. Other topics 
for future research include PT’s inﬂ  uence on con-
tracting behaviour and strategies for improving central 
bank credibility under PT.
The choice of an inﬂ  ation target and/or the implemen-
tation of a price-level target could have implications 
for the problem of the zero lower bound. This possibil-
ity needs to be explored more thoroughly, particularly 
in the current ﬁ  nancial climate.
More generally, in this review we aimed at conveying 
a sense of our ﬁ  ndings and the avenues by which they 
will inform the 2011 decision regarding the Bank’s 
monetary policy framework, while highlighting ques-
tions that must be addressed in the time that remains. 
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